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Abstract
Evaluating the robustness of a defense model is a challenging task in adversar-
ial robustness research. Obfuscated gradients, a type of gradient masking, have
previously been found to exist in many defense methods and cause a false signal
of robustness. In this paper, we identify a more subtle situation called Imbal-
anced Gradients that can also cause overestimated adversarial robustness. The
phenomenon of imbalanced gradients occurs when the gradient of one term of the
margin loss dominates and pushes the attack towards to a suboptimal direction.
To exploit imbalanced gradients, we formulate a Margin Decomposition (MD)
attack that decomposes a margin loss into individual terms and then explores the
attackability of these terms separately via a two-stage process. We examine 12
state-of-the-art defense models, and find that models exploiting label smoothing
easily cause imbalanced gradients, and on which our MD attacks can decrease
their PGD robustness (evaluated by PGD attack) by over 23%. For 6 out of the 12
defenses, our attack can reduce their PGD robustness by at least 9%. The results
suggest that imbalanced gradients need to be carefully addressed for more reliable
adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are input instances
crafted by adding small adversarial perturbations to natural examples. Adversarial examples can
fool DNNs into making false predictions with high confidence, and transfer across different models
[37, 17, 45, 22, 51]. This has become a major concern for the deployment of DNNs in safety-sensitive
applications [16, 14, 28]. A number of defenses have been proposed to overcome this vulnerability.
However, a concerning fact is that many defenses have been quickly shown to have undergone
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incorrect or incomplete evaluation [4, 3, 15, 41, 30, 21]. One common pitfall in adversarial robustness
evaluation is the phenomenon of gradient masking [32, 40] or obfuscated gradients [3], leading to
weak or unsuccessful attacks and false signals of robustness. To demonstrate “real" robustness, newly
proposed defenses claim robustness based on results of white-box attacks such as PGD [29], and at the
same time, demonstrate that they are not a result of obfuscated gradients. In this work, we show that
the robustness may still be overestimated even when there are no obfuscated gradients. Specifically,
we identify a new situation called Imbalanced Gradients that exists in several state-of-the-art defense
models and can cause highly overestimated robustness.
Imbalanced gradients is a new type of gradient masking effect where the gradient of one loss term
dominates that of other terms. This causes the attack to move toward a suboptimal direction. Different
from obfuscated gradients, imbalanced gradients are more subtle and are not detectable by the
detection methods used for obfuscated gradients. To exploit imbalanced gradients, we propose a
novel attack named Margin Decomposition (MD) attack that decomposes the margin loss into two
separate terms, and then exploits the attackability of these terms via a two-stage attacking process.
We derive MD variants of traditional attacks like PGD and MultiTargeted (MT) [18], and deploy
these MD attacks to re-examine the robustness of 12 adversarial training-based defense models. We
find that 6 of them are susceptible to imbalanced gradients, and their robustness originally evaluated
by the PGD attack drops significantly against our MD attacks. Our key contributions are:
• We identify a new type of subtle effect called imbalanced gradients, which can cause
highly overestimated adversarial robustness and cannot be detected by detection methods
for obfuscated gradients. Especially, We highlight that label smoothing is one of the major
causes of imbalanced gradients.
• We propose Margin Decomposition (MD) attacks to exploit imbalanced gradients. MD
leverages the attackability of the individual terms in the margin loss in a two-stage attacking
process. We also introduce two variants of MD for existing attacks PGD and MT.
• We conduct extensive evaluations on 12 state-of-the-art defense models and find that 6 of
them suffer from imbalanced gradients and their PGD robustness drops by more than 9%
against our MD attacks. Our MD attacks exceed state-of-the-art attacks when imbalanced
gradients occur.
2 Background
We denote a clean sample by x, its class by y ∈ {1, · · · , C} withC the number of classes, and a DNN
classifier by f . The probability of x being in the i-th class is computed as pi(x) = ezi/
∑C
j=1 e
zj ,
where zi is the logits for the i-th class. The goal of adversarial attack is to find an adversarial example
xadv that can fool the model into making a false prediction (e.g. f(xadv) 6= y), and is typically
restricted to be within a small -ball around the original example x (e.g. ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ ).
Adversarial Attack. Adversarial examples can be crafted by maximizing a classification loss ` by
one or multiple steps of adversarial perturbations. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17] is a
one-step attacking method, which can be applied iteratively via the Basic Iterative Method (BIM)
attack [24]. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [29] attack is another iterative method that projects
the perturbation back onto the -ball centered at x when it goes beyond. Carlini and Wagner (CW)
[4] attack generates adversarial examples via an optimization framework. Whilst there exist other
attacks such as Frank-Wolfe attack [7], distributionally adversarial attack [52] and elastic-net attacks
[8], the most commonly used attacks for robustness evaluations are FGSM, PGD, and CW.
Several recent attacks have been proposed to produce more accurate robustness evaluations than
PGD. This includes Fast Adaptive Boundary Attack (FAB) [9], MultiTargeted (MT) attack [18],
Output Diversified Initialization (ODI) attack [38], and AutoAttack (AA) [10]. FAB finds the
minimal perturbation necessary to change the class of a given input. MT [18] is a PGD-based attack
with multiple restarts and picks a new target class at each restart. ODI provides a more effective
initialization strategy with diversified logits. AA attack is a parameter-free ensemble of four attacks:
FAB, two proposed Auto-PGD attacks with different loss functions, and the black-box Square Attack
[2]. AA has demonstrated to be one of the state-of-the-art attacks to date [10].
Adversarial Loss. Many attacks use Cross Entropy (CE) as the adversarial loss: `ce(x, y) =
− logpy. The other commonly used adversarial loss is the margin loss [4]: `margin(x, y) =
2
zmax − zy, with zmax = maxi 6=y zi. Shown in [18], CE can be written in a margin form (e.g.
`ce(x, y) = log(
∑C
i=1 e
zi)− zy), and in most cases, they are both effective. While FGSM and PGD
attacks use the CE loss, CW and several recent attacks such as MT and ODI adopt the margin loss.
AA has one PGD variant using the CE loss and the other PGD variant using the Difference of Logits
Ratio (DLR) loss. DLR can be regarded as a “relative margin” loss. In this paper, we identify a new
effect that causes overestimated adversarial robustness from the margin loss perspective and propose
new attacks by decomposing the margin loss.
Adversarial Defense. In response to the threat of adversarial attacks, many defenses have been
proposed such as defensive distillation [31], feature/subspace analysis [46, 27], denoising techniques
[20, 25, 35], robust regularization [19, 39, 34], model compression [26, 11, 33] and adversarial
training [17, 29]. Among them, adversarial training via robust min-max optimization has been found
to be the most effective approach [3]. A number of new techniques have been proposed to further
enhance the adversarial training [43, 50, 5, 1, 42, 48, 49, 44, 23, 12, 6]. We will discuss and evaluate
these adversarial training-based defenses with our proposed attacks in Section 4.
3 Imbalanced Gradients and Margin Decomposition Attack
We first give a toy example of imbalanced gradients and show how regular attacks can fail in such a
situation. We then empirically verify their existence in deep neural networks, particularly for some
adversarially-trained models. Finally, we propose the Margin Decomposition attack to exploit the
imbalanced gradients. Since CE and margin loss are the two commonly used loss functions for
adversarial attack and CE can be written in a margin form [18], here we focus on the margin loss to
present the phenomenon of imbalanced gradients.
Imbalanced Gradients. The gradient of the margin loss (e.g. `margin(x, y) = zmax − zy) is the
combination of the gradients of its two individual terms (e.g. ∇x(zmax−zy) = ∇xzmax+∇x(−zy)).
Imbalanced Gradients is the situation where the gradient of one loss term dominates that of other
term(s), pushing the attack towards a suboptimal direction.
misclassfied
correct
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Figure 1: A toy illustration of imbalanced
gradients at x = 0: the gradient of mar-
gin loss (z2 − z1) is dominated by its −z1
term, pointing to a suboptimal attack direc-
tion towards +2, where x is still correctly
classified.
Toy Example. Consider a one-dimensional classifica-
tion task and a binary classifier with two outputs z1
and z2 (like logits of a DNN), Figure 1 illustrates the
distributions of z1, z2 and z2 − z1 around x = 0. The
classifier predicts class 1 when z1 ≥ z2, otherwise
class 2. We consider an input at x = 0 with correct pre-
diction y = 1, and a maximum perturbation constraint
 = 2 (e.g. perturbation δ ∈ [−2,+2]). The attack is
successful if and only if z2 > z1. In this example, im-
balanced gradients occurs at x = 0, where the gradients
of the two terms∇xz2 and ∇x(−z1) have opposite di-
rections, and the attack is dominated by the z1 term
as ∇x(−z1) is significantly larger than ∇xz2. Thus,
attacking x with the margin loss will converge to +2,
where the sample is still correctly classified. However,
for a successful attack, x should be perturbed towards
-2. In this particular scenario, the gradient ∇xz2 < 0
alone can provide the most effective attack direction.
3.1 Imbalanced Gradients in DNNs
The situation can be extremely complex for DNNs with high-dimensional inputs, as imbalanced
gradients can occur at each input dimension. It thus requires a metric to quantitatively measure the
degree of gradient imbalance. Here, we propose such a metric named Gradient Imbalance Ratio
(GIR) to measure the imbalance ratio for a single input x, which can then be averaged over multiple
inputs to produce the imbalance ratio for the entire model.
Definition of GIR. To measure the imbalance ratio, we focus on the input dimensions that are
dominated by one loss term. An input dimension xi is dominated by a loss term (e.g. zmax) means
that 1) the gradients of loss terms at xi have different directions (∇xizmax · ∇xi(−zy) < 0), and
3
Natur
alMadr
y SenseFeaSc
atterBilate
ral
AdvIn
terp
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
Gr
ad
ie
nt
 Im
ba
la
nc
e 
Ra
tio
(a)
Madr
y SenseFeaSc
atterBilate
ral
AdvIn
terp
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
zmax
zy
CE
zmax zy
(b)
8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8
2
1
0
1
2
M
ar
gi
n 
Lo
ss
(c)
Figure 2: (a): Gradient imbalance ratio of 5 models. (b): Attack success rate of PGD-20 with different
losses. (c): The margin loss of the AdvInterp defense model on points x∗ = x+ α · sign(∇x(−zy)),
where x is a natural sample and sign(∇x(−zy)) is the signed gradient of loss term −zy. All these
experiments are conducted on test images of CIFAR-10.
2) the gradient of the dominant term is larger (e.g. |∇xizmax| > |∇xi(−zy)|). According to the
dominant term, we can split these dimensions into two subsets xs1 and xs2 where xs1 are dominated
by the zmax term, while xs2 are dominated by the −zy term. The overall dominance effect of each
loss term can be formulated as r1 =
∥∥∇xs1 (zmax − zy)∥∥1 and r2 = ∥∥∇xs2 (zmax − zy)∥∥1. Here,
we use the L1-norms instead of L0-norms (i.e. the number of dominated dimensions) to also take
into consideration the gradient magnitude. To keep the ratio larger than 1, GIR is computed as:
GIR = max{ r1r2 , r2r1 }.
GIR of both Naturally- and Adversarial-trained DNNs. With the GIR metric, we next investigate
6 DNN models including a naturally-trained (Natural) model and 5 adversarially-trained models
using standard adversarial training [29] (Madry), sensible adversarial training [23] (Sense), feature
scattering-based adversarial training [48] (FeaScatter), bilateral adversarial training [42] (Bilateral),
and adversarial interpolation training [49] (AdvInterp). We present these defense models here because
they represent different levels of gradient imbalance (a complete analysis of more models can be
found in Appendix D). Natural, Madry and Sense are WideResNet-34-10 models, while others are
WideResNet-28-10 models. We train Natural and Madry following typical settings in [29] while
others use their officially released models. We compute the GIR scores of the 6 models based on
1000 randomly selected test samples, and show them in Figure 2a. One major observation is that
some defense models can have a much higher imbalance ratio than either naturally-trained or Madry’s
model. This confirms that gradient imbalance does exist in DNNs, and some defenses tend to train
the model to have highly imbalanced gradients. We will show, in Section 4, that this situation of
imbalanced gradients can cause highly overestimated robustness when evaluated using a traditional
PGD attack.
Imbalanced Gradients Reduce Attack Effectiveness. When there are imbalanced gradients, the
attack can be pushed by the dominant term to produce weak attacks, and the non-dominant term alone
can lead to more successful attacks. To illustrate this, in Figure 2b, we show the success rates of PGD
attack on the above 5 defense models (Natural has zero robustness against PGD) with different losses:
CE loss, margin loss, and the two individual margin terms. We consider 20-step PGD (PGD-20)
attacks with step size /4 and  = 8/255 on all CIFAR-10 test images. Intuitively, the two margin
terms could lead to less effective attacks, as they only provide partial information about the margin
loss. This is indeed the case for the low gradient imbalance model Madry. However, for highly
imbalanced models Sense, FeaScatter, Bilateral and AdvInterp, attacking the zmax term produces
even more powerful attacks than attacking the margin loss.
This indicates that the gradient of the margin loss is shifted by the dominant term (e.g. −zy in this
case) towards a less optimal direction, which inevitably causes less powerful attacks. Compared
between attacking CE loss and attacking −zy , they achieve a very close performance on imbalanced
models. This shows a stronger dominant effect of −zy in CE loss (`ce(x, y) = log(
∑C
i=1 e
zi)− zy).
It is worth mentioning that, while both GIR and this individual term-based test can be used to check
whether there are significantly imbalanced gradients in a defense model, GIR alone cannot fully
reflect the attack success rate. Figure 2c shows an example of how the −zy term leads the attack
to a suboptimal direction: the margin loss is flat at the∇x(−zy) direction, yet increases drastically
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Figure 3: Changes in gradient imbalance ratio when apply PGD-20 ( = 8255 ) attack with the margin
loss (a), only the zmax term (b), or only the −zy term (c), on the AdvInterp model for 5 CIFAR-10
test images. The imbalance ratio is effectively reduced by attacking a single zmax term.
at an opposite direction. In this example, the attack can actually succeed if it increases (rather than
decreases) zy .
Gradients can be Balanced by Attacking Individual Loss Terms. Here, we show that, interest-
ingly, imbalanced gradients can be balanced by attacking the non-dominant term. Consider the
AdvInterp model tested above as an example, the dominant term is −zy. Figure 3 illustrates the
GIR values of 5 randomly selected CIFAR-10 test images by attacking them using PGD-20 with
different margin terms or the full margin loss. As can be observed that, for all three losses, the GIRs
are effectively reduced after the first few steps. However, only the non-dominant term zmax manages
to stably reduce the imbalance ratio to around 2. This indicates optimizing the individual terms
separately can help avoid the situation of imbalanced gradients and the attack can indeed benefit from
more balanced gradients (see the higher success rate of zmax in Figure 2b).
3.2 Margin Decomposition Attack
Algorithm 1 Margin Decomposition Attack
1: Input: clean sample x, label y, model f .
2: Output: adversarial example xadv
3: Parameters: Perturbation bound , step size α,
number of restarts n, number of steps K.
4: xadv ← x
5: for r ∈ {1, ..., n} do
6: Initialize x0 by one step of perturbation
along the opposite direction of gradients.
7: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
8: Update xk by Eq. (1)
9: if `(xadv) < `(xk) then
10: xadv ← xk
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: return xadv
The above observations motivate us to exploit the indi-
vidual terms in the margin loss so that the imbalanced
gradients situation can be circumvented. Specifically,
we propose Margin Decomposition (MD) attack that
decomposes the attacking process with a margin loss
into two stages: 1) alternately attacking the two individ-
ual terms (e.g. zmax or −zy) at different restarts; then
2) attacking the full margin loss. Formally, our MD
attack and its loss functions in each stage is defined as
follows:
xk+1 = Π(xk + α · sign(∇x`rk(xk, y))), (1)
`rk(xk, y) =

zmax if k < K2 and r mod 2 = 0
−zy if k < K2 and r mod 2 = 1
zmax − zy if k ≥ K2 ,
where, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the perturbation step, r ∈
{1, . . . , n} is the r-th restart, mod is the modulo operation for alternating optimization, and `rk
defines the loss function used at the k-th step and r-th restart. The loss function switches from
the individual terms back to the full margin loss at step K2 . The first stage exploits individual loss
terms to rebalance the imbalanced gradients, while the second stage ensures that the final objective
(e.g. maximizing the classification error) is achieved. Note that, not all defense models have the
imbalanced gradients problem. A model is susceptible to imbalanced gradients if there is a substantial
difference between robustness evaluated by PGD attack and that by our MD attack. In addition, to
help escape the flat loss landscape observed in Figure 2c, we initialize the perturbation in the first
stage by perturbing one step with size 2 ·  along the opposite direction of the other loss terms that
are left unexplored. A detailed description of our MD attack can be found in Algorithm 1 and an
ablation study of our attack can be found in Appendix F.
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We also propose a Margin Decomposition Multi-Targeted (MDMT) attack, a multi-targeted version
of our MD attack:
xk+1 = Π(xk + α · sign(∇x`rk(xk, y))), (2)
`rk(xk, y) =

zt if k < K2 and r mod 2 = 0
−zy if k < K2 and r mod 2 = 1
zt − zy if k ≥ K2 ,
where, zt is the logits of the target class t 6= y. Like the MT attack, MDMT will attack each possible
target class one at a time, then select the strongest adversarial example at the end. That is, the target
class t 6= y will be switched to a different target class at each restart. The complete algorithm of
MDMT can be found in Appendix E.
4 Experiments
We apply our MD attacks to evaluate the robustness of 12 state-of-the-art defense models. We focus
on adversarial training models, which are arguably the strongest defense approaches to date [3, 10].
All the models are WideResNet variants [47] and are trained against perturbation  = 8/255 on
CIFAR-10. For each defense model, we either download their shared models or retrain the models
using the official implementations, unless explicitly stated. Further details about the models can be
found in Appendix C. We apply current state-of-the-art attacks and our MD attacks to evaluate the
robustness of these models in a white-box setting.
Baseline Attacks and Settings. Following the current literature, we consider 6 existing attacks:
1) FGSM, 2) PGD, 3) L∞ version of CW attack [29, 43], 4) MultiTargeted (MT) attack and two
concurrently proposed attackss 5) AutoAttack (AA), and 6) Output Diversified Initialization (ODI).
The evaluation is done under the same maximum perturbation  = 8/255 for training. For AA and
ODI, we use the official implementation and parameter setting. For regular iterative attacks, we set
the step size to α = /4 and the total perturbation steps to K = 40. For our MD and MDMT, we use
a large step size α = 2 ·  in the first stage for a better exploration and α = /4 in the second stage
to ensure a stable optimization for the final objective. For regular attacks PGD, CW and our MD,
we use 2 random restarts, while for more powerful attacks ODI, MT and MDMT, we use 20 restarts
(MT attacks require more restarts to explore multiple target classes). A parameter analysis of our MD
attack can be found in Appendix G. Adversarial robustness is measured by the model accuracy on
adversarial examples crafted by these attacks on CIFAR-10 test images.
4.1 Evaluation Results
Table 1 reports the full evaluation result, where RST, UAT and TRADES are the top 3 best defenses.
The Madry defense demonstrates ∼ 45% robustness consistently against either PGD or stronger
attacks such as MT, AA, ODI and our MD attacks. This indicates that Madry does not have imbalanced
gradients and indeed brings consistent robustness, which is in line with other studies about Madry
[3, 10, 41]. While the rest 11 defense models are all developed based on Madry, they exhibit quite
different robustness. Only 4 defenses including RST, UAT, TARDES and MART are indeed improved
over Madry, while the other 7 defense models are actually not as robust as Madry, according to
our MD or MDMT attacks. For the 4 improved defenses, their PGD robustness (e.g. robustness
evaluated by PGD attack) can still be reduced by stronger attacks MT, AA, ODI or our MD attacks.
Considering that their robustness drops against our MD attacks are within 5%, their drops may be
caused by sufficient explorations such as more random restarts or better initialization rather than
imbalanced gradients. Indeed, MT, AA, and ODI with more random restarts, multiple target classes,
and better initialization can also reduce their robustness to the same level as our MD attacks.
Out of the 7 unimproved defenses, our MDMT attack can reduce the PGD robustness of 6 models
(e.g. MMA, Bilateral, Adv-Interp, FeaScatter, Sense, and JARN-AT11) by at least 9%. On all 7
unimproved defenses, our MD attacks are always the most effective attacks compared to either classic
attacks FGSM, PGD, CW, or more recent attacks MT, AA and ODI. Note that, for 4 (e.g. MMA,
Bilateral, Adv-Interp, and Sense) out of the 7 unimproved defenses, even state-of-the-art attacks
MT or AA evaluate them to be more robust than Madry, which is not necessarily the case according
to our MD attacks. Particularly, against the MT attack, the robustness of Madry is 45.34%, while
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Table 1: Robustness (%) of 12 defense models evaluated by different attacks. The attacks are divided
into 2 groups: 1) traditional attacks for robustness evaluation and our MD (column 3-6); and 2) more
recent attacks and our MDMT (column 7-10). The defenses are also divided into 2 groups: 1) Madry
or better defenses (top rows); and 2) those that are not as good as Madry (bottom rows). Results in (·)
in the MDMT column show the robustness decrease compared to the PGD attack.
Defense Clean FGSM PGD CW MD MT AA ODI MDMT
RST [5] 89.69 69.60 62.09 60.87 60.17 59.80 59.66 59.93 59.86 (-2.23)
UAT [1] 86.46 68.31 61.08 62.11 59.36 56.72 56.94 57.98 56.65 (-4.43)
TRADES [50] 84.92 60.87 55.00 53.69 53.10 52.67 53.18 52.68 52.78 (-2.22)
MART [44] 83.09 61.43 56.10 53.02 51.84 51.12 51.05 51.15 51.07 (-5.03)
Madry [29] 86.83 56.88 45.94 45.73 45.64 45.34 45.17 45.26 45.25 (-0.69)
Dynamic [43] 85.35 55.19 46.36 45.53 43.93 42.75 42.88 43.03 42.69 (-3.67)
MMA [12] 84.62 61.85 51.09 52.05 45.63 42.62 45.69 43.00 41.92 (-9.17)
Bilateral [42] 90.73 71.10 60.95 57.82 39.82 55.07 37.96 38.65 37.21 (-23.74)
Adv-Interp [49] 90.25 77.94 72.48 67.92 45.33 61.22 38.58 41.43 37.59 (-34.89)
FeaScatter [48] 89.98 77.40 68.64 57.10 43.12 43.10 38.79 39.61 36.86 (-31.78)
Sense [23] 91.51 72.71 59.86 57.67 40.64 46.22 36.10 38.15 35.25 (-24.61)
JARN-AT1 [6] 81.96 61.48 42.50 27.46 15.03 16.01 30.11 14.90 14.60 (-27.90)
the robustness of Bilateral, Adv-Interp and Sense are 55.07%, 61.22% and 46.22%, respectively.
For the MMA defense, AA attack evaluates its robustness to be 45.69%, which is slightly higher
than Madry’s 45.26%. However, under our MD attacks, all 4 models show much lower robustness
than Madry (3%-10% lower). Next, we will investigate the imbalanced gradients problem in the
unimproved defenses.
4.2 Defense Techniques that may Cause Imbalanced Gradients
Here, we focus on 6 unimproved (compared to Madry) defenses: MMA, Bilateral, Adv-Interp,
FeaScatter, Sense, and JARN-AT1. Their PGD-evaluated robustness has been reduced for > 9% by
our MDMT attack.
Label Smoothing Causes Imbalanced Gradients. The PGD robustness of Bilateral, FeaScatter,
and Adv-Interp decrease the most (e.g. 23%− 34%) against our MDMT attack. This indicates that
these defenses may have caused imbalanced gradients, as also indicated by their high GIR values
in Figure 2a. All three defenses use label smoothing as part of their training scheme to improve
adversarial training, which we suspect is one common cause of imbalanced gradients. Given a
sample x with label y, label smoothing encourages the model to learn an uniform logits or probability
distribution over classes j 6= y. This tends to smooth out the input gradients of x with respect to
these classes, resulting in smaller gradients. In order to confirm label smoothing indeed causes
imbalanced gradients, we train a WideResNet-34-10 model using natural training (‘Natural’) and
Madry adversarial training with or without label smoothing (smoothing parameter 0.5). We report
their robustness in Table 2, and show their gradient imbalance ratios (GIRs) in Figure 4. According
to GIRs, adding label smoothing into the training process immediately increases the imbalance ratio,
especially in natural training. The PGD robustness of the naturally-trained model also “increases"
to 10.86%, which is still 0% under our MD attack. Using smoothed labels in Madry defense also
“increases" PGD robustness by almost 5%, which in fact, decreases by 1%. These evidences confirm
that label smoothing indeed causes imbalanced gradients, leading to overestimated robustness if
evaluated by regular attacks like PGD. Interestingly, it appears that adversarial training can inhibit
moderately the imbalanced gradients problem of label smoothing. This is because the adversarial
examples used for adversarial training are specifically perturbed to the j 6= y classes, thus helping
avoid uniform logits over classes j 6= y to some extent.
Other Defense Techniques that may Cause Imbalanced Gradients. The other 3 unimproved
defenses MMA, Sense and JARN-AT1 adopt different defense techniques to improve robustness.
MMA is a margin-based defense that maximizes the shortest successful perturbation for each data
point. MMA only perturbs correctly classified clean examples, and the perturbation stops immediately
at misclassification (into a j 6= y class). In other words, MMA focuses on examples that are around
the decision boundary (e.g. zmax = zy) between class y and all other classes j 6= y. During training,
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Table 2: Robustness (%) of WideResNet-34-10
models trained with/without label smoothing.
Defense FGSM PGD MD
Madry 56.88 46.47 45.71
+ Label Smoothing 59.10 51.15 44.54
Natural 26.41 0.00 0.00
+ Label Smoothing 48.09 10.86 0.00
Natural Madry0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
GI
R
Vanilla
Label Smoothing
Figure 4: Gradient Imbalance Ratio (GIR) of
models trained with/without label smoothing.
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(c) MDMT (Ours)
Figure 5: Gradient imbalance ratio at the first 20 steps of ODI (a), FAB (b) and our MDMT (c) attacks
on the AdvInterp model for 5 randomly selected CIFAR-10 test images.
the decision boundary margin is maximized by pulling the boundary away from these examples. This
process tries to maximize the distance to the closest decision boundary (e.g. towards the weakest
class) and finally results in equal distances to all other classes. This tends to generate a uniform
prediction over classes j 6= y, a similar effect of label smoothing, and causes imbalanced gradients.
Similar to MMA, Sense perturbs training examples until a certain loss threshold is satisfied. While
in MMA the threshold is misclassification, in Sense, it is the loss value with respect to probability
(e.g. py = 0.7). This type of training procedures with a specific logits or probability distribution
regularization has caused the imbalanced gradients problem for both MMA and Sense. Note that,
Sense causes much severe imbalanced gradients than MMA. We conjecture it is because optimizing
over a probability threshold is much easier than moving the decision boundary.
JARN-AT1 is also a regularization-based adversarial training method. Different from MMA or Sense,
it regularizes the model’s Jacobian (e.g. input gradients) to resemble natural training images. Such an
explicit input gradients regularization tends to reduce the input gradients to a much smaller magnitude
and only keep the salient part of input gradients. The input gradients associated with other j 6= y
classes will be minimized to cause an imbalance to that associated with class y. This has caused PGD
to produce 27.90% more robustness than our MDMT attack. Note that, even the recent AA attack
still produces 15.51% overestimated robustness compared to our MDMT.
4.3 An Attack View of Imbalanced Gradients
As shown in Table 1, recent attacks ODI and AA are more effective than traditional attacks PGD and
CW against imbalanced gradients. Here, we provide some insights into why these techniques are
effective against imbalanced gradients. We consider attacking AdvInterp as an example and show
how the gradient imbalance ratio (GIR) changes in different attacking processes. Figure 5 shows the
GIR values of 5 randomly selected CIFAR-10 test images at the first 20 steps of ODI, FAB, or our
MDMT attack. The FAB attack is the most effective attack in the AA ensemble.
Logits Diversified Initialization Helps Avoid Imbalanced Gradients. ODI randomly initializes
the perturbation by adding random weights to logits at its first 2 steps. The random weights change
the gradients’ size, thus can also mitigate imbalanced gradients, as shown in Figure 5a. However,
initialization only helps the first 2 steps, and the imbalance ratio still jumps in the following steps.
Our attack provides a more direct and efficient exploration of imbalance gradients, thus can maintain
a low imbalance ratio even after the first few steps (see Figure 5c). As also shown in Table 1, our
MDMT attack is consistently more effective than ODI.
Exploration Beyond the -ball Helps Avoid Imbalanced Gradients. AA is an ensemble of four
attacks: two proposed PGD variants and two existing attacks FAB and Square Attack. By inspecting
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the individual attacks, we found that the most effective method is FAB. FAB first finds a successful
attack using unbounded perturbation size (e.g. > ), then minimizes the perturbation to be within
the -ball. As shown in Figure 5b, the first few steps of exploration outside the -ball can effectively
avoid imbalanced gradients. This is also why our MD attacks use a large step size in the first stage.
However, the imbalance ratio tends to increase when FAB attempts to minimize the perturbation
(steps 10 - 16). We believe FAB can be further improved following our decomposition strategy.
Imbalanced Gradients are not Easily Detected or Circumvented by Existing Methods. We also
show, in Appendix A, that defense models with imbalanced Gradients can still pass the five checking
rules of obfuscated gradients, and that many times of restarts with random initialization or momentum
method does not help escape imbalanced gradients in Appendix B. This makes imbalanced gradients
more subtle and should be carefully checked to avoid overestimated robustness.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify Imbalanced Gradients, a new situation where traditional attacks such as PGD
can fail and produce overestimated adversarial robustness. We proposed a new metric to quantitatively
measure the gradient imbalance ratio, and investigated the imbalanced gradients problem in current
defense models. We also proposed a new attack called Margin Decomposition (MD) attack to
leverage imbalanced gradients. MD attacks decompose and exploit the two terms of a margin loss
via a two-stage attacking process. By evaluating 12 state-of-the-art defense models, we find that 6
of them are susceptible to imbalanced gradients and their PGD robustness suffers a significant drop
against our MD attacks. We identified a set of possible causes of imbalanced gradients, and effective
countermeasures. Future defenses should avoid causing overestimated robustness by imbalanced
gradients, and use our MD attacks to achieve more reliable adversarial robustness evaluation.
6 Broader Impact
Our work highlights a new pitfall in adversarial robustness evaluation, and provides a more accurate
evaluation method. It can benefit different application domains to build more robust deep learning
models against adversarial examples. The failure of our method may lead to less accurate evaluations,
which should be carefully examined with other evaluation methods.
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A Imbalanced Gradients are Different from Obfuscated Gradients
Imbalanced gradients occur when one loss term dominating the attack towards a suboptimal gradient
direction, which does not necessarily block gradient descent like obfuscated gradients. Therefore, it
does not have the characteristics of obfuscated gradients, and can not be detected by the five checking
rules for obfuscated gradients [3]. Here, we test all the five rules on the four defense models that
exhibited significant imbalanced gradients: Adv-Interp, FeaScatter, Bilateral, and Sense. Note that all
these models were trained and tested on CIFAR-10 dataset.
One-step attacks perform better than iterative attacks. When gradients are obfuscated, iterative
attacks are more likely to get stuck in a local minima. To test this, we compare the success rate of
one-step attack FGSM and iterative attack PGD in Table 3. We see that PGD outperforms FGSM
consistently on all the four defense models, i.e., no obvious sign of obfuscated gradients.
Unbounded attacks do not reach 100% success. Increasing distortion bound does not increase
success. Larger distortion bound gives the attacker more ability to attack. So, if gradients are not
obfuscated, unbounded attack should reach 100% success rate. To test this, we run an “unbounded"
PGD attack with  = 1. As shown in Table 3, all models are completely broken by this unbounded
attack. This again indicates that the overestimated robustness is caused by a different effect rather
than obfuscated gradients.
Black-box attacks are better than white-box attacks. If a model is obfuscating gradients, it should
fail to provide useful gradients in a small neighborhood. Therefore, using a substitute model should be
able to evade the defense, as the substitute model was not trained to be robust to small perturbations.
To test this, we run black-box transferred PGD attack on naturally trained substitute models. We find
that all four defenses are robust to transferred attacks (“Transfer" in Table 3). We also attack the four
defense models using gradient-free attack SPSA [41]. For SPSA, we use a batch size of 8192 with
100 iterations, and run on 1000 randomly selected CIFAR-10 test images. We confirm that SPSA
cannot degrade their performance. None of these results indicate obfuscated gradients.
Random sampling finds adversarial examples. Brute force random search within some -ball
should not find adversarial examples when gradient-based attacks do not. Following [3], we choose
1000 test images on which PGD fails. We then randomly sample 105 points for each image from its
 = 8/255-ball region, and check if any of them are adversarial. The results (e.g. “Random") shown
in Table 3 confirms that random sampling cannot find an adversarial example when PGD does not.
All the above test results lead to one conclusion that the robustness of the four defenses is not a result
of obfuscated gradients. This indicates that imbalanced gradients does not share the characteristics
of obfuscated gradients, thus cannot be detected following the five test principles for obfuscated
gradients. This makes adversarial robustness evaluation more difficult. Therefore, imbalanced
gradients should be carefully addressed for more accurate robustness evaluation.
Table 3: Test of obfuscated gradients for four defense models that have significant imbalanced
gradients following [3]: attack success rate (%) of different attacks. None of the above results
indicates a clear sign of obfuscated gradients.
Defense FGSM PGD Unbounded Transfer SPSA Random
Adv-Interp [49] 23.06 27.52 100.00 10.89 24.80 0.00
FeaScatter [48] 22.60 31.36 100.00 11.11 28.20 0.00
Bilateral [42] 28.90 39.05 100.00 9.23 36.00 0.00
Sense [23] 27.29 40.14 100.00 9.90 37.90 0.00
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B Can Random Restart or Momentum Help Circumvent Imbalanced
Gradients?
As we discussed in Section 3, many times of random starts can potentially increase the probability
of finding an adversarial example. Momentum method is another way to help escape overfitting to
local gradients [36]. Here, we test whether random restart or momentum can help avoid imbalanced
gradients. For random restart, we run 400-step PGD attack with 100 restarts (PGD100×400). For
momentum, we use momentum iterative FGSM (MI-FGSM) [13] with 40 steps, 2 restarts and
momentum 1.0. For both attacks, we set  = 8/255 and step size α = 2/255. We apply the two
attacks on 1000 randomly chosen CIFAR-10 test images, and report the robustness in Table 4 for
the four defense models checked in Section A. Compared to traditional PGD with 40 steps, the
robustness can indeed be decreased by PGD100×400 except Bilateral, an observation consistent with
our analysis in Section 3 that more restarts can lower model accuracy. However, the robustness is
still highly overestimated compared to that by our MDMT attack. This indicates that imbalanced
gradients can exist in wide-spanned input regions, resulting in a low probability for random restart to
find successful attacks. To our surprise, MI-FGSM performs even worse than traditional PGD. On
three defense models (eg. Adv-Interp, FeaScatter, and Sense), it produces even higher robustness
than PGD. This implies that accumulating velocity in the gradient direction can make the overfitting
even worse when there are imbalanced gradients. This again confirms that the imbalanced gradients
problem should be explicitly addressed to obtain more reliable adversarial robustness.
Table 4: Robustness (%) of four defense models that have significant imbalance gradients against
PGD100×400 and MI-FGSM attack.
Defense PGD MDMT PGD100×400 MI-FGSM
Adv-Interp 72.48 37.59 70.70 73.25
FeaScatter 68.64 36.86 64.10 70.79
Bilateral 60.95 37.21 64.08 51.52
Sense 59.86 35.25 56.00 62.41
C 12 Examined Defense Models
We focus on adversarial training models, which are arguably the most effective defense models to date.
The 12 selected defense models are as follows. The standard adversarial training (Madry) [29] trains
models on adversarial examples generated by PGD attack. Dynamic adversarial training (Dynamic)
[43] trains on adversarial examples with gradually increased convergence quality. Max-Margin
Adversarial training (MMA) [12] trains on adversarial examples with gradually increased margin
(e.g. the perturbation bound ). For MMA, we evaluate the released “MMA-32” model. Jacobian
Adversarially Regularized Networks (JARN) adversarially regularize the Jacobian matrices, and can
be combined with 1-step adversarial training (JARN-AT1) to gain additional robustness [6]. For
JARN, we only evaluate the JARN-AT1 as JARN has already been completely broken in [10]. We
implement JARN-AT1 on the basis of their released implementation of JARN. Sensible adversarial
training (Sense) [23] trains on loss-sensible adversarial examples (perturbation stops when loss
exceeds certain threshold). Bilateral Adversarial Training (Bilateral) [42] trains on PGD adversarial
examples with adversarially perturbed labels. For Bilateral, we mainly evaluate its released strongest
model “R-MOSA-LA-8”. Adversarial Interpolation (Adv-Interp) training [49] trains on adversarial
examples generated under an adversarial interpolation scheme with adversarial labels. Feature
Scattering-based (FeaScatter) adversarial training [48] crafts adversarial examples using latent space
feature scattering, then trains on these examples with label smoothing. TRADES [50] replaces the CE
loss of Madry by the KL divergence for a better trade-off between robustness and natural accuracy.
Based on TRADES, RTS [5] and UAT [1] improve robustness by training with 10× more unlabeled
data. Misclassification Aware adveRsarial Training (MART) [44] further improves the above three
methods with a misclassification aware loss function.
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D Gradient Imbalanced Ratio of More Defense Models
In this Section, we provide a complete analysis on the gradient imbalance ratios (GIRs) of all 12
examined defense models and a naturally trained model. The GIR values of these models are shown
in Figure 6. One immediate observation is that the GIR value of a defense model is positively
correlated with its robustness drop against our MDMT attack in Table 1. Slightly imbalanced defense
models Madry, TRADES and RST demonstrate minimum robustness drop, while the PGD-evaluated
robustness of highly imbalanced defense models FeaScatter, Bilateral and AdvInterp can drop
drastically against our MD attacks. This verifies that higher gradient imbalance can indeed causes
more overestimated robustness by regular PGD attack.
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Figure 6: Gradient imbalance ratios (GIRs) of 12 defense models and a naturally trained model
(“Natural”). All models are trained on CIFAR-10 dataset.
E MDMT Attack Algorithm
Algorithm 2 below describes the complete attacking procedure of our Margin Decomposition Multi-
Targeted (MDMT) attack.
Algorithm 2 Margin Decomposition MultiTargeted attack
1: Input: clean sample x, class label y, class set T , model f .
2: Output: adversarial example xadv
3: Parameters: Perturbation bound , PGD step size α, number of restarts n, number of steps K.
4: nr ← bn/|T |c, xadv ← x
5: for r ∈ {1, ..., nr} do
6: for t ∈ T do
7: Initialize x0 by one step of perturbation along the opposite direction of gradients.
8: for k ∈ {1, ...,K} do
9: Update xk by Eq. (2)
10: if `(xadv) < `(xk) then
11: xadv ← xk
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: return xadv
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F Ablation of the Proposed MD Attacks
In this section, we investigate the influence of two factors to our MD attack: 1) initialization method,
and 2) the second attacking stage. We use AdvInterp as our target model, and conduct the following
attack experiments on CIFAR-10 test data.
Initialization Method. We compare the success rates of our MD attacks using random initialization
versus the opposite direction initialization (see Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2). The results are reported
in Table 5. As can be observed, the opposite direction initialization demonstrates a clear advantage
over random initialization. Particularly, for MD attack, using opposite direction initialization can
improve the attack success rate by 8%, while for MDMT attack, the success rate can also be improved.
The Second Attacking Stage. We further investigate the importance of the second stage of attacking
with the full margin loss in our MD attacks. Here, we fix the initialization method to the opposite
direction initialization. The attack success rates with or without the second stage are also reported in
Table 5. We highlight that attacking the full margin loss via the second attacking stage can consistently
increase the success rate. Especially for MD attack, a 4.99% improvement can be achieved by the
second attacking stage.
Table 5: Attack success rates (%) of our MD and MDMT attacks with 1) different initialization
methods, and 2) with/without the second attacking stage. Experiments are conducted on defense
model AdvInterp and dataset CIFAR-10.
Attacks Initialization Second Attacking Stage
Random Opposite without with
MD 46.32 54.67 49.68 54.67
MDMT 61.07 62.41 61.82 62.41
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G Parameter Analysis of the Proposed MD Attack
We further investigate the sensitivity of our MD attack to two parameters: 1) the number of perturba-
tion steps, and 2) the step size. Here, we focus on the first attacking stage as the second stage is a
typical PGD attack, which has been thoroughly investigated in [43].
Number of Steps for the First Stage. The total number of perturbation steps is set to K = 40.
When we vary the perturbation steps of the first stage, the remaining steps will be given to the second
stage. MD attack will reduce to the regular PGD attack if the perturbation steps of the first stage
is set to 0. Here, we vary the steps from 5 to 40 in a granularity of 5. The step size is set to 8/255
and 2/255 for the first and second attacking stage, respectively. The robustness of 4 defense models
including Bilateral, Adv-Interp, FeaScatter and Sense are illustrated in Figure 7a. As can be observed,
the performance of our MD attack tends to drop at both ends, and the best performance is achieved
at [20, 30]. Therefore, we suggest to simply use half of the perturbation steps for the first stage (e.g.
switching to the second stage at the K2 -th step).
Step Size for the First Stage. We vary the step size used for the first stage from 2/255 to 16/255 in
a granularity of 2/255. Following the above experiments, here we fix the number of steps in each
stage to 20. The evaluated robustness (or model accuracy on the generated attacks) of defense models
Bilateral, Adv-Interp and FeaScatter are illustrated in Figure 7b. A clear improvement of using large
step size in the first stage can be observed. Therefore, we suggest to use a large step size for the first
stage of exploration.
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Figure 7: Parameter analysis of MD attack: (a) the accuracies of 5 defense models under MD attacks
with different number of perturbation steps in the first stage; (b) the accuracies of 5 defense models
under MD attacks with different step sizes in the first stage.
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